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Estate of MYH.TI~E J:;,. \VELCH, Deceased. AH.THUR A. 
FAIRCHILD, Appellant, v. GgHALDINE F. ADAMS, 
Respondent. 
[1] Wills-Undue Influence-Definition and What Constitutes.-
The undue influence which will warrant setting asidE' a will 
must be such as in effect destroys testator's free agency and 
substitutes for his own another will. 
[2] !d.-Undue Influence-Operation on Testamentary Act.-To 
set aside a will on ground of undue influence, evidence must be 
produced to show that pressure was brought to bear directly 
on testamentary act. 
[3] !d.-Undue Influence-General Influence.-.Mere general in-
fluence, however strong nnd controlling, will not authorize 
setting aside a will if it does not bear on testamentary act; 
the influence must be used directly to procure the will and must 
amount to coercion destroying testator's free agency. 
[4] Id.-Undue Infiuence-Opportunity.-Mere opportunity to in-
fluence mind of testator, even when coupled with an interest 
or a motive to do so, is immfficient to show undue influence. 
[5] !d.-Undue Infl.uence-Evidence.-To overthrow a will for un-
due inf-luence, it is not sufficient for contestant merely to prove 
circumstances consistent with exercise of such influence: he 
must prove circumstances inconsistent with voluntary action 
on testator's part. 
[6] Id.- Undue Influence- Opportunity.-~The fact that testa-
trix' brother, in Jiving alone with her after her husband's death, 
may have had opportunity unduly to influence her to change 
her will so as to make him instead of her sister beneficiary 
thereof is insufficient to establish undue influence, in absence 
of evidence produced by contestant of influence bearing on 
testamentary act or anything indicating coercion or lack of 
free agency on testatrix' part when she executed the will. 
[7] Id.-Undue Influence-Confidential Relations.-Te~tatrix' act 
in making her brother sole beneficiary of will to exclusion of 
her sister and certain nephews does not stem from confidential 
relationship existing between testatrix and brother so as to 
indicate any undue influence, where evidence establishes con-
siderable quarreling and bickering among relatives when 
[1 J See Cal.Jur., Wills, 3 13 et seq.; Am.Jur., Wills, § 350 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Wills,§ 78; [2] Wills,~ 81; [3] Wills, 
§82; [4, 6] Wills, §99; [5] Wills, §134; [7, 8] Wills, §109; [9] 
Wills,§ 95; [10] Wills,§ 147; [11] Wills,§ 264. 
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Id.-Undue Influence-Mental and 
trix.-Testatrix' mental and 
as to warrant aside her will on 
C.2d 
Condition of Testa-
i!uence where evidence shows that she was a clear thinking, 
deliberate woman, awan: of her and financial 
and that it was not until a few before her 
which occurred four years after execution of that 
her condition dcterioratPd. 
!d.-Naturalness-Discrimination Between Objects of Bounty. 
testatrix preferred one her as 
to other relatives, such as her sister and nephews, 
such does not make the will unnaturaL 
!d.-Republication-Effect of CodiciL---Where testatrix made 
her brother sole of her will and two years later 
executed a eodicil him as tlw exeeution of 
the eodicil has effect of rcexecution of will and removes any 
'""''""'v"~ taint of undue influenee which might be argued with 
respect to its procurement. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles denying probate of a \Yill and codicil. Clar-
ence L. ,Judge. Heversed. 
Hobert.~:.\. ,Jarrott and LeRoy Thomas for Appellant. 
Austin, Austin, Jones & Chaffee for Respondent. 
J.-'l'his is an appeal 
Fairchild from a judgment 
proponent Arthur A. 
probate of a will and 
codicil. 
:B-,. \Velch died December 22, 1951. She was a widow 
at the time of her husband having died January 21, 
1947. She had no children. Her heirs at law and next of kin 
were two brothers and a sister. By a will dated February 
27, 1947, she left all her property to one brother, Arthur A. 
Fairchild; and by a codicil dated December 26, 1949, she 
Codicil validating will or codieil which was invalid or 
inoperative at time of its purported execution, note, 21 A.L.R.2d 
821. See, also, CaLJur., Wills, § 158; Am.Jur., Wills, § 626. 
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named him to serve as executor without bond. Arthur Fair-
child the will and codicil for Geraldine 
F. contested their 
unsoundness of mind; 
; and lack 
execution. the 
of due execution of both the will 
the third of contest was dismissed motion of the 
contestant. At the close of the contestant's case, the court 
granted 's motion for a nonsuit as to the first 
ground of for trial 
influence. a vote of 10 to 2 the in answer to 
special that both the will and the codicil were 
procured the undue influence of the Judg-
ment denying their probate was thereupon entered; and from 
such judgment proponent appeals. 
Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to 
support the jury's finding of undue influence, and that the 
trial court committed prejudicial error in the giving and 
the refusal of certain instructions. It will be unnecessary to 
discuss this latter assignment of error, for it appears that 
appellant's contention that the evidence was insufficient to 
support the jury's finding must be sustained. 
[1] In Estate of Arnold, 16 Cal.2d 573, at page 577 [107 
P.2d 25], the rules governing the determination of whether a 
testamentary instrument is the product of undue influence 
are stated as follows: ''In an action to set aside a will of a 
deceased person on the ground of undue influence, it is 
necessary to show that the influence was such as, in effect, 
to destroy the testator's free agency and substitute for his 
own another person's will. (Estate of !Jfotz, 136 Cal. 558, 583 
[69 P. 294] .) [2] Evidence must be produced that pressure 
was brought to bear directly upon the testamentary act. (In re 
McDevitt, 95 Cal. 17, 33 [30 P. 101].) [3] Mere general in-
fluence, however strong and controlling, not brought to bear 
upon the testamentary act, is not enough ; it must be influence 
used directly to procure the will and must amount to coercion 
destroying free agency on the part of the testator. (Estate 
of Keegan, 139 Cal. 123, 127 [72 P. 828] .) . . . [4] mere 
opportunity to influence the mind of the testator, even coupled 
with an interest or a motive to do so, is not sufficient. (Estate 
of Ea,ston, 140 Cal.App. 367, 371 [35 P.2d 614] .) 
"'The unbroken rule in this state is that courts must 
refuse to set aside the solemnly executed will of a deceased 
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the of undue influence unless there be 
''a pressure ·which overpowered the mind and bore 
down the volition of the testator at the very time the will was 
made." ' (Estate of Oleason, 164 Cal. 756, 765 [130 P. 
872] .) " See also Estate of Carithers, 156 Cal. 422, 428 
[105 P. 127]; Estate 38 Cal.2d 571, 586-587 
[241 P.2d 990]; Estate 83 Cal.App.2d 15, 19-20 
[187 P.2d 889]; Estate 83 Cal.App.2d 534, 
563-564 [189 P.2d 822, 191 P.2d 419]; Estate Greenhill, 
99 Cal.App.2d 155, 168 [221 P.2d :310] Estate of Williams, 
99 Cal.App.2d :302, :310 [221 P.2d 714]; Estate of Dobrzensky, 
105 Cal.App.2d 134, 14:3 [2:32 P.2d 886]. In the light of these 
settled principles, tl1e evidence viewed most favorably to con-
testant must be examined. 
The testatrix Myrtle, her husband, and her brother Arthur 
had lived together for a number of years. Arthur was a 
prospecting mining engineer, and his work took him out of 
town for weeks at a time. \Vhen Myrtle's husband died 
January 21, 1947, Arthur was not living with them. Myrtle's 
sister Geraldine made the funeral arrangements. In accord-
ance with Myrtle's wishes, Arthur was not notified of the 
death until two or three days after the funeral. Meanwhile 
Myrtle and Geraldine decided that Myrtle should sell her 
home in Compton and live with Geraldine in Long Beach. 
Myrtle listed her home for sale with a real estate broker. 
Each of the sisters then made a handi\Titten will dated ,Janu-
ary 28, 1947. Geraldine thereby gave Myrtle the use of her 
house (not exclusively) for life, with the residue of the estate 
to go to one of Geraldine's sons. Myrtle left to Geraldine all 
of her property excepting $6,500, which sum Geraldine was 
to hold as trustee for Arthur. Both Myrtle and Arthur had 
received $6,500 from their parents' estate, and thereafter, 
as they made successive wills over the years, each always be-
queathed to the other this amount of family inheritance. 
About February 1, 1947, while the two sisters were packing 
Myrtle's belongings to move to Geraldine's home, Arthur 
appeared at Myrtle's house in response to Myrtle's letter. 
Geraldine testified that she saw the letter before it was mailed, 
and that in it Myrtle asked Arthur to come and take hi!> 
things out of the garage. Arthur testified that he had long 
before taken all his belongings from the garage, and that 
:Myrtle had simply written to ask him to come to her at that 
trying time following her husband's death. The letter was 
not produced at the trial. Immediately upon Arthur's arrival. 
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a heated discussion developed. Geraldine testified that ''the 
first thing" Arthur said was "Myrtle, now that Fred is gone, 
you will have to make out a new will, and if you will every-
thing you have to me, I will will everything I have to you." 
Arthur pleaded with Myrtle to stay where she was and make 
a home for him. Geraldine had a tantrum. Myrtle and 
Arthur then went for a ride in his car. ·when they returned, 
Arthur told Geraldine "Take your things and get out of here. 
I am going to stay with Myrtle." Then Arthur and Geraldine 
began to argue, whereupon Myrtle beckoned Geraldine to 
come into the yard and Myrtle said: ''I have stood all I can 
stand of fighting. You will just have to do as he says ... I 
will stay here until he gets his things out of the garage, then 
I will ease him out without fighting." 
Thereafter Myrtle and Arthur lived together in Myrtle's 
home until Myrtle died. The real estate listing was cancelled; 
and within a few weeks after Arthur's return, Myrtle and 
Arthur made new wills. Myrtle made the will here involved 
on February 28, 1947. She thereby left all her property to 
Arthur. Its approximate value was $18,000. At that time 
she was 68 years old. Arthur's will left to Myrtle $25.000, 
part cash and part mining claims of speculative value but 
apparently all that he had. Then almost two years later and 
on December 26, 1949, when Myrtle was 70 years old, Myrtle 
made the codicil here involved naming Arthur executor. At 
the same time Arthur named Myrtle to act as executrix of his 
will. No one except Myrtle and Arthur was present when 
the wills and codicils were executed. 
Myrtle was of a mild disposition and tried to avoid quarrels 
with Arthur. 'l'here were disputes with the relatives over 
the prevailing home arrangements between Myrtle and Arthur, 
and Arthur systematically excluded Geraldine and her sons 
from the house. However, Myrtle surreptitiously visited 
Geraldine in Long Beaeh when Arthur was away on his fre-
quent mining trips. There was testimony that about two 
weeks before Myrtle died, Arthur arranged 'vith a mortician 
for an inexpensive burial service for her rather than the usual 
fnnrral; that dPspite Myrtle's illne~s of some weeks, Arthnr 
did not summon a doctor until a few hours before Myrtle 
died; that the mortieian found Myrtle's body filth? and 
emaciatt>(1 in an unkempt bed; and that when the relativrs 
heard of Myrtle's death, they arranged a proper funeral for 
her at their own expense, which funeral Arthur did not 
attend. 
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this evidence the found that Myrtle's proposed 
will and codicil were the result of the undue influence of 
Arthur. Motions for the verdict 
and for new trial were denied. Arthur appeals from the 
entered on the verdict. He properly maintains that 
the evidence upon which the determined that the dis-
lvhich made of her her will and 
codicil should be set aside falls far short of the requirements 
to the showing of undue influence under the estab-
lished rules. 
[5] It is not sufficient for a contestant merely to prove 
circumstances consistent with the exercise of undue influence; 
but before the will can be overthrown the circumstances must 
be inconsistent with voluntary action on the part of the 
testator. (Estate of Donovan, 114 Cal.App. 228, 233 [299 P. 
816] .) [6] Arthur, in living alone with Myrtle, may have 
had the opportunity to unduly influence her but there was no 
evidence produced by the contestant so bearing upon the testa-
mentary act or anything indicating coercion or lack of free 
agency on the part of Myrtle when she executed the will. 
[7] 'rhe heated discussion among the relatives upon Arthur's 
appearance at Myrtle's home, when it was finally decided that 
he and Myrtle should live together, occurred about February 
1 and more than three weeks elapsed before Myrtle made her 
will of February 27, 1947. While by that will Myrtle chose 
to make her brother Arthur her sole beneficiary to the ex-
elusion of her sister Geraldine and certain nephews, such 
testamentary act does not appear to stem from a confidential 
relationship existing between Arthur and Myrtle. Rather, the 
evidence adduced by contestant was all to the contrary, af-
firmatively and effectively establishing considerable quarreling 
and bickering among the relatives and Myrtle's attempt to 
keep peace by not provoking any unnecessary arguments. 
[8] Consanguinity of itself does not create a fiduciary rela-
tionship. (Estate of Llewellyn, supra, 83 Cal.App.2d 534, 
562.) [9] Myrtle's mental and physical condition was not 
shown to have been such as to permit a subversion of her 
freedom of will or to negate her independent management of 
her ovm affairs. On the contrary, so far as appears from the 
record, Myrtle was at all times a clear thinking, deliberate 
woman. aware of her property holdings and financial situation, 
and 1t was not until a few days before her death that her gen-
eral eondition deteriorated. 
There was no evidence that Myrtle at any time after 
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making the will any testamentary intentions at 
variance therewith. [10] While she thereby preferred one 
relative, her brother Arthur, as beneficiary to other relatives, 
her sister Geraldine or nephews, such discrimination did not 
make the will unnatural. (Estate of Llewellyn, supra, 83 Cal. 
App.2d 534, 566; see also Estate of Arnold, supra, 16 Cal. 
2d 573, 588.) Arthur as heir of Myrtle's estate valued at ap-
proximately $18,000 did not unduly profit from her will, for 
he had made his will leaving his property to her, $25,000 in 
cash and mining claims. He and Myrtle had discussed his 
mining interests, and she presumably was aware of their 
speculative nature and the basis of their valuation as a pros-
pective inheritance. Arthur was absent on frequent mining 
trips for several weeks at a time, when Myrtle might have 
changed her will, and yet there was no evidence that she ever 
wished or undertook to do so. Rather, almost two years after 
execution of the will, Myrtle added a handwritten codicil 
to her handwritten will, on the same paper, merely appointing 
Arthur as executor. Manifestly the testamentary disposition 
of her property was then drawn to her attention, and yet 
Myrtle did not elect to make any change. [11] While Ger-
aldine argues that Arthur's conduct upon moving into 
Myrtle's home following the death of Myrtle's husband oper-
ated to coerce Myrtle into making the will in question over 
three weeks later, there was no semblance of a showing of 
any pressure or overpowering activity on his part at or near 
the time of her execution of the codicil. The latter act had 
the effect of reexecution of the will and removed any possible 
taint of undue influence which might be argued with respect 
to its original procurement. (Estate of Baird, 176 Cal. 381, 
385 [168 P. 561] ; also anno. 21 A.L.R.2d 823, 831.) 
Contestant cites the cases of Estate of Snowball, 157 Cal. 
301 [107 P. 598], and Estate of Teel, 25 Cal.2d 520 [154 P.2d 
384], as authority for affirmance of the finding of undue in-
fluence here. But the facts of those cases clearly distinguish 
them from the present situation. In Estate of Snowball the 
contestant, a son of the testatrix, was practically disinherited 
by his aged mother, who was under the domination of her 
daug·hter and made the will in response to her daughter's con-
tinned importunitif's and in eonformity with the latter's 
wishes. There was evidence of the testatrix' declaration of help-
less submission to her daughter's control in the daughter's 
presence, which was not denied. Also false representations rela-
tive to the contestant's previous inheritance from his father's 
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will were shown to have been made by the 
purpose of affecting the mother's disposition of her property 
by the will. In Estate of Teel the testatrix disinherited the 
contestant, her only daughter by a former marriage, and left 
all her property-most of which had been aequired from her 
former husband, the contestant's father, on his death-to her 
second husband, to whom the testatrix had been married but 
a few months and who was the proponent of the will in ques-
tion. There was evidence that the testatrix had serious mental 
defects including a suicidal mania, and that she did commit 
suicide some eighteen days after execution of the will. Under 
circumstances showing the fiduciary relationship existing be-
tween the proponent and the testatrix as husband and wife, 
his "unduly profiting by the will, ... its being unnatural, 
and [his J activity ... in procuring its execution," it was 
held that there was "persuasive evidence of undue influence" 
as found by the jury. (25 Cal.2d 528.) 
.At most, the record here shows no more than that .Arthur 
was so situated as to have had an opportunity to un-
duly influence the mind of Myrtle, and that his actions and 
conduct at times might be regarded as suspicious; but to say 
that from such evidence it may be found that .Arthur "over-
powered the mind and bore down the volition of the [testatrix] 
at the very time the will was made" would be to permit 
Myrtle's will to be overturned not upon proof but upon 
speculation. (Estate of Gleason, 164 Cal. 756, 765 [130 P. 
872].) Moreover, the final testamentary act in question was 
Myrtle's execution of the holographic codicil republishing 
her will, and as to which there was not the slightest basis for 
finding that it was the product of undue influence by Arthur. 
(See Estate of Dobrzensky, supra, 105 Cal.App.2d 134, 144.) 
Under the settled rules, it must be held that there is not suffi-
cient evidence in the record on the issue of undue influrnce 
to sustain the jury's verdict, and the will and codicil here in 
question should have been admitted to probate as the last will 
and testament of the decedent Myrtle F. Welch. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Shenk, .Acting C. J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., and Bray, 
J. pro tem.,* concurred. 
SCHAUER. J., Dissenting.-In my view thr eYidence, con-
strued favorable to sustaining the judgment (see Estate of 
• Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
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Bristol (1943), 23 CaL2d 221, 223-224 [143 P.2d 689]; Estate 
Teel ( , 25 Cal.2d 520, 526 [154 P.2d 384] ; Estate of 
Jamison ( 1953), 41 CaL2d 1, 13 [256 P.2d 984]), amply 
supports all essential implied findings of the jury. Accordingly, 
I would affirm the judgment. 
J.-I dissent. 
Section 19 of article VI of the Constitution of California 
: "The court may instruct the jury regarding the law 
applicable to the facts of the case, and may make such com-
ment on the evidence and the testimony and credibility of any 
witness as in its opinion is necessary for the proper determina-
tion of the case. The court shall inform the jury in all cases 
that the jurors are the exclusive judges of all questions of fact 
submitted to them and of the credibility of the witnesses." 
(Emphasis added.) And section 371 of the Probate Code 
provides "Any issue of fact involving ... the due execution 
and attestation of the will, or any other question substantially 
affecting the validity of the will, must be tried by a jury 
nnless a jury is waived .... " 
The foregoing provisions make it abundantly clear that 
fact finding in cases involving wills is as essentially the 
province of a jury as in any other field of the law. I ex-
pressed my views in this respect in my dissent in Estate of 
l;ingenfelter, 38 Cal.2d 571 at page 588 [241 P.2d 990], and 
I cannot refrain from reiterating here that the majority of this 
court has, in this field of the law probably more than in any 
other, violated express constitutional and statutory mandates 
by assuming the role of the fact finder and reversing judg-
ments based upon jury verdicts which have not only been 
approved by the trial judge but have been affirmed by a 
unanimous decision of a District Court of Appeal and where 
this court has been divided on the very issue of the sufficiency 
of the evidence to support the verdict. In this case, we have 
10 jurors rendering a verdict on the issue of undue influence; 
we have an able and outstanding trial judge denying motions 
for a nonsuit, directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding 
the Yerdict and for a new trial; and three able and eminent 
jurists of the District Court of Appeal rendering a nnanimons 
decision affirming the judgment (Estate of Welch * (Cal. 
App.) 261 P.2d 18 )-holding the evidence sufficient to estab-
lish the issue of undue influence. In addition to thr above 
·• A hearing was granted by the Supreme Court on N ovrmb;·r Hl, Hl;J3. 
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we have Mr. Justice Schauer and on this court--a 
total of six judges in addition to the 10 members of the jury 
-all of the opinion that the evidence is sufficient to support a 
finding of undue influence. 
It is impossible for me to rationalize or reconcile the 
'""'n•.un of the majority here with any concept of the well 
and traditional rule that an issue of fact becomes 
an issue of law only where the evidence is such that only one 
conclusion can be reached reasonable minds. In other 
words if the evidence is such that reasonable minds might 
differ as to the conclusion to be reached, the issue is one of 
fact and not law, and an appellate court is bound by the de-
termination of the trier of fact. I say that I cannot rationalize 
or reconcile the position of the majority in this case with such 
a rule when we have 10 jurors and six judges taking the 
position that there is sufficient evidence that the will and 
codicil were procured by undue influence, and only five jus-
tices of this court taking the position that there is no sub-
stantial evidence to this effect. 
I think it is time that this court should speak more frankly 
in cases of this character and honestly state the basis for its 
refusal to recognize the well settled and traditional rule 
with respect to the question of when there is an issue of fact 
to be determined. In the case at bar it is obvious that the 
majority of this court has weighed the evidence and come to 
the conclusion that it is insufficient to support a finding of 
undue influence. In so doing the majority has violated the 
Constitution of this state in depriving the litigants in this 
case of their right to a trial by jury. The majority has done 
this by substituting its view as to the weight of the evidence 
for that of the jury, the trial judge, the three members of the 
District Court of Appeal and two members of this court. 
There is no question in my mind but that the majority 
decision in this case is based solely upon the view that it and 
not the jury or the trial judge should determine factual 
issues in cases of this character. This view is in direct conflict 
with the Constitution and statutes of this state, and in my 
opinion a judge of this court who concurs in such a decision 
is violating his oath of office. 
To say that there is no evidence of undue influence exercised 
by the proponent of the will and codicil over the testatrix 
in this case is shocking to my sensibilities. The evidence shows 
that when Arthur returned after the death of Myrtle's hus-
band she had made up her mind to sell her home and live 
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with her sister Geraldine. Arthur told her she should not do 
so. At that time he said to "Myrtle, now that Fred is 
gone, you will have to make out a new will, and if you will 
everything you have to me, I will will everything I have to 
you.'' He then told Geraldine to ''Take your things and get 
out of here. I am to ·with " He then lived 
with and her under his surveillance and refused 
to permit any of her relatives to visit her. She made a will in 
accordance with his demands within three weeks thereafter. 
He continued to live with her and keep her under his sur-
veillance for approximately two years and then she executed 
a codicil naming him as executor without bonds. He per-
mitted her to lie in a filthy bed without medical or nursing 
care when she was sick and and would not permit her 
relatives to visit her. To say that an inference of undue in-
fluence could not be drawn from such conduct is to disregard 
that which any fair and reasonable minded person would be 
justified in concluding if he believed the evidence on behalf 
of contestants. 
To my mind the evidence of undue influence in this case 
is overwhelming, and the reversal of the judg-ment denying 
probate to the will and codicil here involved will result in a 
rank miscarriage of justice. I would therefore affirm the 
judgment. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied July 28, 
1954. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., were of the opinion that the 
petition should be granted. 
